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State Subprime Lending 
Litigation and Federal 
Preemption: Toward a National  
Standard 
 
Alan H. Scheiner* 
 
Introduction 
 
5HVLGHQWLDO 0RUWJDJH %DFNHG 6HFXULWLHV ´50%6µ DQG
other structured finance products, such as Collateralized Debt 
2EOLJDWLRQV ´&'2Vµ based on RMBS, lie at the heart of the 
financial crisis, and mortgage lending practices are currently in 
the crosshairs of state and federal legislators and regulators.  
2Q0DUFKWKH0RUWJDJH%DQNHUV$VVRFLDWLRQ´0%$µ
reported that 11.93% of all American mortgages were either in 
foreclosure or at least one month overdue, the highest 
percentage rate since the MBA began reporting these figures in 
1972.1   Although the cascade of financial losses has coursed far 
from the RMBS and subprime sectors, those areas will no 
doubt remain a focus of attention as mortgage delinquency 
rates continue to climb.  State statutes targeted at subprime 
lending, created before the current crisis, now co-­exist with 
new Federal Reserve amendments to Regulation Z, under the 
IHGHUDO7UXWKLQ/HQGLQJ$FW´7,/$µDLPHGDWWKHYHU\VDPH
market sector.  Legal reform efforts will no doubt include an 
attempt to revive and refashion the mortgage securitization 
system that created the previously profitable, and now 
LQIDPRXVO\´WR[LFµDVVHWV7KLV$UWLFOHDUJXHVWKDWVXFKHIIRUWV
should include the creation of uniform national standards for 
mortgage origination and mortgage-­holder liability in order to 
support transparency and predictability in the marketplace. 
 
*  Alan H. Scheiner is Counsel at the law firm of Levi Lubarsky & 
Feigenbaum, LLP, a Manhattan law firm.  He practices in the area of 
financial litigation, often on behalf of major financial institutions. 
1. 3UHVV 5HOHDVH 0RUWJDJH %DQNHUV $VV·Q Delinquencies Continue to 
Climb in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Mar. 5, 2009), available 
at http://www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/68008.htm. 
1
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The dual system of federal and state banking in the United 
States creates a patchwork quilt of statutes and regulations, 
issued at both the state and federal level.  This system imposes 
different laws on different banks, even though they may be 
operating side-­by-­side.  The degree of difference depends not 
only on whether the financial institutions were created by state 
or federal law, but also on the specific area of banking at issue.  
National banks, for example, are generally exempt from state 
banking-­directed regulation as a result of the National Bank 
Act and other statutes granting banking powers to federally 
chartered institutions.2  On the other hand, some of the 
activities of state-­created banks are either partially or 
exclusively federally regulated.  For example, some states are 
precluded from limiting interest rates on first mortgages, made 
by virtually any lender, under the Depository Institutions 
'HUHJXODWLRQ DQG 0RQHWDU\ &RQWURO $FW ´','0&$µ3  In 
DGGLWLRQ ´DOWHUQDWLYHPRUWJDJH WUDQVDFWLRQVµ LH DGMXVWDEOH-­
UDWHPRUWJDJHV ´$50Vµ DQG EDOORRQSD\PHQWmortgages are 
exempt from state law regulations (at least in some states) 
when used either by state or federally chartered institutions.4  
 
2. See, e.g., National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Seventh), 371, 484 
(2006);; Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 10-­13 (2007);; Beneficial 
1DW·O%DQNY$QGHUVRQ8S. 1, 9-­10 (2003) (holding that the National 
Bank Act provides the exclusive cause of action against national banks for 
usury);; Barnett Bank of Marion City, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 27-­28 
 KROGLQJ WKDW EDQN·V SRZHU WR VHOO LQVXUDQFH LV SURWHFWHG by federal 
ODZ )UDQNOLQ 1DW·O %DQN RI )UDQNOLQ 6TXDUH Y 1HZ<RUN  86 
377-­KROGLQJWKDWDVWDWHPD\QRWSURKLELWDGYHUWLVLQJRI´VDYLQJVµ
account by national bank);; 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007 (deposit taking activities), 
7.4008 (non-­real estate lending), 7.4009 (other authorized activities), 34.3-­.4 
(real estate lending) (2009);; 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2008) (preemption of state 
regulation of federal savings banks). 
3. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1735f-­7a(a)(1)-­(2) (noting that state laws regarding 
interest rates do not apply to defined mortgages or to federally regulated 
banking institutions).  The National Housing Act, § 527(b), defines by 
reference those mortgage loans that are covered by the DIDMCA.  12 U.S.C. § 
1735f-­5(b).  States had the opportunity to opt-­out of this blanket preemption 
regarding interest rates, but only a minority chose to do so.  Deanne Loonin 
& Elizabeth Renuart, The Life and Debt Cycle: The Growing Debt Burdens of 
Older Consumers and Related Policy Recommendations, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
167, 175 (2007) (citing Elizabeth Renuart & Kathleen E. Keest, The Cost of 
Credit: Regulation, Preemption and Industry Abuses § 3.9.4.1 (2005)). 
4. See ,OO$VV·QRI0RUWJDJH%URNHUVY2IILFHRI%DQNV	5HDO(VWDWH
308 F.3d 762, 766 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that federal statute expressly 
preempts any state law that would prevent a state-­licensed lender from 
making a loan permitted by federal law).  The statute, intended to create 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/20
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Other practices, such as disclosures governed by TILA, are left 
to the states with regard to institutions organized under state 
law, so long as state rules do not conflict with federal law.5 
With respect to subprime lending, aggressive state 
legislation has created particular uncertainty, with real-­world 
economic effects.  For H[DPSOH 6WDQGDUG	 3RRU·V UHIXVHV WR
rate RMBS containing subprime mortgage pools that 
originated in certain states.6  Recent litigation heralds an 
increasing impact for state subprime lending laws, while 
inconsistency with federal law grows and preemption issues 
become more complex. 
Under the current system, mortgage market participants 
and the courts struggle to make sense of the tangle of 
conflicting laws and regulations.  Any reform should involve 
movement towards uniform national standards for mortgage 
lending to reduce uncertainty and to foster transparency and 
predictability in a market sorely in need of both.  As set forth 
below, at a minimum, national banks that hold mortgages, 
RMBS, and their derivatives should be exempt from state 
subprime lending laws, which would otherwise impose liability 
or losses if a national bank holds mortgages running afoul of 
such state laws. 
 
 
XQLIRUP UXOHV IRU VWDWH DQG IHGHUDO LQVWLWXWLRQV VWDWHV  ´$Q DOWHUQDWLYH
mortgage transaction may be made by a housing creditor in accordance with 
this section, notwithstanding any State constitution, law or UHJXODWLRQµ  12 
86& F $Q ´DOWHUQDWLYHPRUWJDJH WUDQVDFWLRQ> @µ LV DQ\PRUWJDJH
where the finance charge or interest rate may be renegotiated, or where the 
debt matures at the end of an interval shorter than the amortization schedule 
(balloon SD\PHQWRULQYROYLQJDQ\WHUPVWKDW´LQYROYHWKHVKDULQJRIHTXLW\
RU DSSUHFLDWLRQµ  Id. § 3802(1).  See also id   GHILQLQJ ´KRXVLQJ
creditorsµDVDOOOHQGHUVH[FHSWXQOLFHQVHGXQFKDUWHUHGHQWLWLHV6WDWHVDOVR
had the opportunity to opt-­out of the federal statute, but only a minority did 
so.  Loonin & Renuart, supra note 3, at 175. 
5. 86&DQRWLQJWKDWVWDWHODZLVQRWSUHHPSWHG´H[FHSW
to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with the provisions of this 
VXEFKDSWHUDQGWKHQRQO\WRWKHH[WHQWRIWKH LQFRQVLVWHQF\µ $FFRUGLQJWR
the Federal Reserve Board, a sWDWH ODZ LV ´LQFRQVLVWHQWµ LI ´LW UHTXLUHV D
creditor to make disclosures or take actions that contradict the requirements 
RIWKH)HGHUDOODZµ&)5 
6. See, e.g., Press ReleDVH 6WDQGDUG 	 3RRU·V 6WDQGDUG 	 3RRU·V
Addresses Massachusetts Regulations Regarding High Cost Loans (Dec. 21, 
2005), available at 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/Massachusetts_Regul
ations_HighCost_Loans.pdf. 
3
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Recent Developments 
 
Since this Article was originally prepared for a symposium 
at Pace University Law School in March 2009, there have been 
significant developments that are not favorable for those who 
argue in support of preemption.  Notable among these 
developments is the June 29, 2009 decision of the United 
States Supreme Court in Cuomo v. Clearing House Association.  
There, the Court held that the visitorial powers of the Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency under the National Bank Act 
preempted the issuance of a subpoena by the New York State 
$WWRUQH\ *HQHUDO XQGHU 1HZ <RUN·V ODZ DXWKRUL]LQJ WKH
LQYHVWLJDWLRQRI´IUDXGXOHQWRULOOHJDODFWVµEXWGLGQRWSUHHPSW
an action against a National Bank to enforce New York State 
law.7   While it is sometimes suggested that the Cuomo decision 
signals the end of National Bank Act preemption,8 the ruling 
RQO\FRQFHUQVWKHHIIHFWRIWKH)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQW·VH[FOXVLYH
visitorial powers over National Banks.  As explained more fully 
below, the holding does not purport to change the law of 
preemption as applied to state substantive laws governing 
National Banks.  The decision may, however, signal an 
increasing skepticism in the Supreme Court towards 
preemption arguments, contrary to the prior trend. 
In addition, the new leadership of the Department of the 
Treasury has signaled an interest in limiting federal 
SUHHPSWLRQ RI VWDWH ODZ YLHZLQJ IHGHUDO UXOHV DV D ´IORRUµ
rather than a ´FHLOLQJµ GHVSLWH SURSRVLQJ DQ LQFUHDVH LQ WKH
scope and detail of federal regulation of bank lending 
practices.9   At present this sentiment remains only a proposal 
and has not resulted in the repeal of the federal regulations 
relied on by the courts in finding preemption.  Notably, the 
comprehensive federal consumer financial protection program, 
which is proposed by the Obama administration, would defuse 
one of the chief policy arguments against federal preemption: 
 
7. &XRPR Y &OHDULQJ +RXVH $VV·Q  6 &W  -­22 (2009) 
(citing N.Y. EXEC. LAW ANN. § 63(12) (West 2002)). 
8. David A. Scheffel, The National Bank Act: So Much For Preemption, 
N.Y. L.J., Aug. 3, 2009, at 1. 
9. DEP·T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION 61 (2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/20
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the idea that preemption means the absence of regulation.10  In 
any case, changes in the regulatory landscape affecting the 
scope of federal preemption of state banking law must be 
expected. 
 
I. State Subprime Lending Laws and Market Uncertainty 
 
A recent count shows that at least twenty-­five states, plus 
the District of Columbia, have statutes targeted at subprime 
lending practices.11  Many of these statutes impose liability for 
damages and other remedies resulting from loans that violate 
WKDW VWDWXWH·V UHTXLUHPHQWV DQG OLPLWV DQG WKH\ DOVR EDU
enforcement and collection on such loans and any related 
mortgages.12 
 
A. Market Uncertainty Due to Assignee Liability 
 
Because the assignees of mortgages³i.e., the trustee 
responsible for securitized pools of mortgages³can be 
VXEMHFWHG WR ´LQGHWHUPLQDWH OLDELOLW\µ XQGHU VRPH VWDWH
SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJ ODZV 6WDQGDUG 	 3RRU·V DQQRXQFHG ZHOO
prior to the current crisis) that it was unable to issue ratings 
for certain RMBS if their loan pools contained mortgages 
originating with state-­regulated lenders, in at least some states 
with subprime lending laws.13  In other states, the ratings 
agency requires that certain contract terms be included in 
securitization deals that include loans from these states.14  In a 
 
10. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit 
Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG    ´)RU PXFK RI WKH
consumer financial product market, the preemption experience has effectively 
been a deregulation experience.µ 
11. See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for 
States as Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 364 (2005);; 
Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences: The Risks of Premature State 
Regulation of Predatory Lending, AM. BANKERS ASS·N, at 20-­21, available at 
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/D881716A-­1C75-­11D5-­AB7B-­
00508B95258D/28871/PredReport200992.pdf.  See also Connecticut Abusive 
Home Loan Lending Practices Act, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-­746 (2008). 
12. Azmy, supra note 11, at 373-­75. 
13. See, e.g., 3UHVV5HOHDVH6WDQGDUG	3RRU·Vsupra note 6. 
14. Natalie Abrams & Maureen Coleman, Evaluating Predatory Lending 
/DZV6WDQGDUG	3RRU·V([SODLQV LWV$SSURDFK6WDQGDUG	3RRU·V Ratings 
Direct (Apr. 15, 2003), http://www.housingchoice.org/news%20stories/0415 
5
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 UHOHDVH 6WDQGDUG 	 3RRU·V H[SODLQHG ZK\ WKLV ZDV
necessary: 
 
>0@RVW LPSRUWDQWO\ IURP 6WDQGDUG 	 3RRU·V
SHUVSHFWLYH D SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJ VWDWXWH·V
imposition of liability on purchasers or assignees 
RI PRUWJDJH ORDQV ´DVVLJQHH OLDELOLW\µ PLJKW
reduce the availability of funds to pay investors 
in securities backed by mortgage loans governed 
by the statute.  This would occur if the purchaser 
or assignee were found to hold a loan that 
YLRODWHG WKH VWDWXWH ´SUHGDWRU\ ORDQµ HYen if 
the purchaser or assignee did not itself engage in 
predatory lending practices.15 
 
With respect to Georgia and New York, for example, Standard 
	3RRU·VUHTXLUHGWKDW WREHUDWHGDQ50%6LVVXHUPXVW: ´L
identify high-­cost loans;; and ii) identify which high-­cost loans 
are predatory and prevent their transfer into the 
VHFXULWL]DWLRQµ16  ,Q DGGLWLRQ ´EHFDXVH RI WKH LQFUHDVHG ULVNV
associated with the inclusion of high-­cost loans in 
VHFXULWL]DWLRQVµ 6WDQGDUG 	 3RRU·V UHTXLUHG WKDW ´WKH
representation and warranty that the loans are in compliance 
with all applicable laws be provided by an entity that has 
sufficient creditworthiness and is willing and financially able to 
repurchase predatory high-­cost loans, as well as cover any 
contingent liability assocLDWHG ZLWK VHFXULWL]LQJµ VXESULPH
loans.17 
 
B. New York Subprime Lending Law: LaSalle Bank, N.A. v.  
Shearon 
 
$TXLFNORRNDWWKHGHWDLOVRI1HZ<RUN6WDWH·V+LJK&RVW
Home Loan statute18 shows how and why state law governing 
subprime loans creates uncertainty.  In LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. 
 
2003.htm. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-­l (McKinney 2009). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/20
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Shearon,19 a debtor prevailed in New York State Supreme 
Court in bringing an affirmative claim against a trustee 
holding mortgages as part of a pool.  The plaintiff, a national 
bank, brought suit as a trustee and holder of a mortgage loan 
LVVXHGE\DVXESULPHOHQGHU:0&0RUWJDJH&RUS´:0&µ20  
7KH GHFLVLRQ VKRZHG WKDW 1HZ <RUN·V VXESULPH VWDWXWH FDQ
result in draconian consequences for the holder of a subprime 
loan who cannot prove that the loan was made in accordance 
with WKH VWDWXWH·V UHTXLUHPHQWV  ,QLaSalle Bank, the court 
ruled on summary judgment that the loan and mortgage were 
void and unenforceable, and it awarded the debtor a panoply of 
damages: the return of all points;; fees and payments on 
principal and interest;; direct and consequential damages in 
DPRXQWV WREHGHWHUPLQHGDWDKHDULQJDQGDWWRUQH\·V IHHV21   
These remedies were assessed against a trustee, i.e., an 
assignee of the loan who, under the common law, would not 
have been subject to defenses or liabilities against the original 
lender, presuming that the trustee was a holder in due course 
or the assignee of such a holder.22 
The New York statute covers first mortgages to individuals 
ZLWK LQWHUHVW UDWHV WKDW ´H[FHHG HLJKW SHUFHQWDJH SRLQWV RYHU
the yield on treasury securities having comparable periods of 
PDWXULW\µ WR WKH PRUWJDJH RU ORDQV ZLWK SRLQWV DQG IHHV
exceeding 5%, among other thresholds.23   The scope of the 
statute is limited, by definition, to loans in amounts conforming 
to the size limits set by the Federal National Mortgage 
$VVRFLDWLRQ ´)DQQLH0DHµ IRU UHSXUFKDVH E\ WKDW LQVWLWXWLRQ
 
19. 881 N.Y.S.2d 599 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (denying motion for 
reconsideration);; LaSalle Bank, N.A. v. Shearon, 850 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 
2008) (granting debtor-­GHIHQGDQW·V FURVV-­motion for summary judgment on 
claim under High Cost Home Loan law).  The plaintiff can be expected to 
appeal this decision, which appears to be the first published decision in New 
York under the High Cost Home Loan law. 
20. LaSalle Bank, 881 N.Y.S.2d at 600. 
21. LaSalle Bank, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 878-­79. 
22. Id.  See also U.C.C. § 3-­302(a)(2) (2005);; Midfirst Bank SSB v. C.W. 
Haynes & Co., 893 F. Supp. 1304, 1319-­20 (D.S.C. 1994) (holding that Ginnie 
Mae, which had acquired the mortgage as part of a pool for securitization, 
was a holder in due course not subject to most defenses against the original 
lender). 
23. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-­l(1)(d), (1)(g)(i) (McKinney 2009) (defining 
´+LJK &RVW+RPH /RDQµ  7KH VWDWXWH FRYHUV ORDQV DSSOLHG IRU RQ RU DIWHU
April 1, 2003.  Id. § 6-­l. 
7
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(presumably, at the time of origination of the loan).24 
The LaSalle Bank court found violations of New York 
Banking Law § 6-­lN ´OHQGLQJ ZLWKRXW GXH UHJDUG WR
UHSD\PHQW DELOLW\µ  -­l(2)(l)(ii) (counseling notice 
requirement), and § 6-­l(2)(m) (points and fees exceeding three 
percent of the principal).25  According to the court, the loan was 
PDGH ´ZLWKRXWGXHUHJDUG IRU UHSD\PHQWDELOLW\µ LQYLRODWLRQ
of § 6-­l(2)(k).  Because the court found that the violations of the 
VWDWXWHZHUH ´LQWHQWLRQDOµ26 the loan and mortgage were void 
and unenforceable under § 6-­l´VWULS>SLQJ@WKHOHQGHUIURP
having a right to collect, receive or retain any principal, 
interest, or other charges whatsoever with respect to the loan, 
as well as giving the borrower the ability to recover any 
SD\PHQWVPDGHXQGHUWKHDJUHHPHQWµ27 
In addition, the court allowed direct and consequential 
damages against the plaintiff³a trustee and, presumably, a 
holder in due course of the mortgage note³for the conduct of 
the lender from whom the loan was acquired.28  There is an 
argument, however, that the statute does not authorize such 
assignee liability.  The statute refers only to causes of action 
againVW ´OHQGHU>V@µ DQG ´PRUWJDJH EURNHU>V@µ29  In a section 
concerning the liability of assignees seeking to enforce covered 
loans, the statute SURYLGHV RQO\ WKDW ´D ERUURZHUPD\ DVVHUW
 
24. Id. § 6-­lH GHILQLQJ ´+RPH /RDQµ  See also Fannie Mae, 
Historical Conventional Loan Limits, 
http://www.fanniemae.com/aboutfm/pdf/historicalloanlimits.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2009);; Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Conforming Loan 
Limit for U.S. to Remain $417,000 in 2009;; Different Limits in Some Areas 
(Nov. 7, 2008), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/GetFile.aspx?FileID=135. 
25. LaSalle Bank, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 873-­78.  See also Alan H. Scheiner, 
Federal Preemption of State Subprime Lending Laws, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 
2008, at 4, 7. 
26. LaSalle Bank, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 875, 878. 
27. Id. at 878-­79.  As a result, the debtor, who had purchased the 
SURSHUW\ZLWK´QRPRQH\GRZQµZRXOGUHFHLYHWLWOHWRWKHSURSHUW\gratis, a 
plainly inequitable consequence, especially where, as in that case, the debtor 
had lied to obtain the loan.  The borrower had claimed on his application a 
significantly greater income than was reported on his tax returns.  Although 
VWDWLQJWKDW´WKLVFRXUWZLOOQRWFRQGRQHIUDXGE\WKHERUURZHUµWKHGHFLVLRQ
noted that the statute requires WKDW DELOLW\ WR SD\ EH ´YHULILHG E\ GHWDLOHG
documentation of all sources of income and corroborated by independent 
YHULILFDWLRQµDSSDUHQWO\HYHQZKHUHWKHERUURZHUDFWLYHO\VRXJKWWRFRQFHDO
the inability to pay.  Id. at 873, 875, 877. 
28. Id. at 878-­79. 
29. N.Y. BANKING LAW § 6-­l(6) (McKinney 2009). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/20
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any claims in recoupment and defenses to payment . . . that the 
borrower cRXOGDVVHUWDJDLQVWWKHRULJLQDOOHQGHURIWKHORDQµ30  
:KLOH WKH ´UHFRXSPHQWµ RISD\PHQWVPD\EHSHUPLWWHG RWKHU
damages against an assignee are not explicitly authorized.31 
 
C. The Massachusetts Decision in Fremont Investment & 
Loan 
 
Another recent development in subprime litigation under 
state law raises the uncertainty level even higher.  In an action 
brought by the Attorney General of Massachusetts, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that a court could enjoin 
foreclosure on mortgages under the unfair trade practice law of 
Massachusetts even though the mortgages were not governed 
by the terms of the Massachusetts Predatory Home Loan 
Practices Act.32  7KH FRXUW XSKHOG WKH WULDO FRXUW·V GHFLVLRQ
enjoining foreclosure (pending settlement or trial on the 
fairness of each specific mortgage transaction) if the mortgage 
contained all of the following characteristics, which the court 
GHHPHGSUHVXPSWLYHO\XQIDLU  ´DQ LQWURGXFWRU\UDWHSHULRG
RI WKUHH\HDUV RU OHVVµ  DQ LQWURGXFWRU\ UDWH WKUHH RUPRUH
percentage points below the fully indexed rate;; (3) a debt-­to-­
income ratio at the fully adjusted rate of more than 50%;; (4) a 
loan-­to-­value ratio of 100% (i.e., no money down), or a 
´VXEVWDQWLDOSUHSD\PHQWSHQDOW\µ RUDQ\SUHSD\PHQWSHQDOW\
beyond the introductory three years.33   Although these 
practices were not prohibited by the terms of any federal or 
state law or regulation at the time the loans were made, the 
court relied on warnings issued by regulators, as well as the 
EDQN·V VHWWOHPHQW ZLWK WKH )HGHUDO Deposit Insurance 
Corporation discontinuing some of these practices, to the effect 
that lending regardless of the ability to repay a loan was 
´XQVDIHµDQG´SUHVXPSWLYHO\XQIDLUµ34   The injunction affects 
 
30. Id. § 6-­l(13). 
31. Id.  The statute would also allow the remedy of rescission against 
assignees, but that at least would have required that the transaction be 
unwound, presumably divesting the borrower of the property and returning 
the original loan proceeds to the lender or its assignee.  Id. § 6-­l(11). 
32. Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 560-­61 
(Mass. 2008). 
33. Id. at 554. 
34. Id. at 559. 
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as many as 2,490 mortgages.35 
Thus, under the Fremont decision, even compliance with a 
VWDWH·V SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJ VWDWXWH ZLOO QRW JXDUDQWHH WKDW D
subprime mortgage is enforceable under state law.  
Accordingly, the protective measures adopted by parties to 
securitization³such as those required by Standard & 3RRU·V³
would be fruitless, because mortgages that were neither 
covered by, nor in compliance with, predatory lending 
legislation would nevertheless be deemed unenforceable.  
Indeed, an entire pool of mortgages, apparently enforceable 
under prior law (whatever that enforcement may be worth in 
WRGD\·VPDUNHW FRXOG EH UHQGHUHG ZRUWKOHVV XSRQ D post hoc 
determination of unfairness.36 
Although the impact of legal uncertainty and litigation risk 
may appear small compared to the overall economic 
impairment of RMBS assets, adding litigation risk to the 
overall systemic risk already in play is the last thing needed by 
struggling institutions and government agencies trying to 
obtain value for illiquid securities.37 
 
 
35. Id. at 552 n.6. 
36. In addition to the Massachusetts action against Fremont, other state 
attorneys general have been active against mortgage lenders.  For example, 
in 2007, Novastar Mortgage, based in Missouri, settled a class action for 
subprime overcharges that were allegedly deceptive under Washington state 
law.  Kenneth C. Johnston et al., The Subprime Morass: Past, Present, and 
Future, N.C. BANKING INST. 125, 133 (2008).  In December 2008, Countrywide 
)LQDQFLDO VHWWOHG SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJ FODLPV EURXJKW E\ HOHYHQ VWDWHV·
attorneys general, resulting in an agreement to provide up to $8.4 billion to 
UHGXFHERUURZHUV·REOLJDWLRQVDIIHFWLQJDOPRVWPRUWJDJHVSee, e.g., 
Andrew Harris, Countrywide Settles Fraud Cases for $8.4 Billion, 
BLOOMBERG, Oct. 6, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aWdK8sUC0Lf0&r
efer=home. 
37. In addition, since this Article was originally prepared, the 
Massachusetts Attorney General obtained a settlement from Goldman Sachs, 
under which that bank³a securitizer but not a lender of subprime 
mortgages³agreed to make $60 million in payments to mortgage holders as 
well as to the State itself.  William M. Bulkeley, Goldman Settles Subprime 
Inquiry, WALL ST. J., May 12, 2009, at C3.  Because this was the result of a 
pre-­litigation settlement, Massachusetts never made clear which law it was 
enforcing when it obtained these payments.  Id. 
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II. The Federal Reserve Board Regulates Subprime Lending 
Under TILA 
 
On July 30, 2008, the Federal Reserve Board issued the 
final version of its amendments to Regulation Z, under TILA as 
amended by the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act 
´+2(3$µ LQWHQGHG WR UHJXODWH VXESULPH PRUWJDJH OHQGLQJ
and provide remedies to borrowers somewhat similar to those 
provided by state subprime laws.38  The new regulations 
became effective October 1, 2009 and govern all lenders, 
whether state-­ or federally-­chartered, and all mortgage loans, 
whether primary or secondary, except Home Equity Lines of 
Credit.39 
Among other things (such as advertising and disclosure 
rules), the regulations create national standards for the 
underwriting of mortgage loans and prohibit the extension of 
credit based solely on the value of collateral without regard to 
repayment ability.40  The regulations require verification of 
income by third-­party documentation, such as tax reporting 
GRFXPHQWV ´WKDW SURYLGH UHDVRQDEO\ UHOLDEOH HYLGHQFH RI WKH
FRQVXPHU·V LQFRPH RU DVVHWVµ DQG YHULILFDWLRQ RI FXUrent 
obligations.41  The regulation establishes additional 
SURKLELWLRQV IRU ´KLJKHU-­SULFHG PRUWJDJH ORDQVµ ZKLFK DUH
defined by relatively modest thresholds: 1.5% above prime for a 
first mortgage and 3.5% above prime for a second mortgage.42  
For higher-­priced mortgage loans, the rule prohibits: (i) 
issuance without regard to repayment ability (as with all 
mortgage loans);; (ii) prepayment penalties, except where those 
penalties apply for no more than two years, are waived for 
 
38. Truth in Lending;; Part III, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) 
(amending Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (2009)). 
39. Id. at 44,522;; 44,531.  The regulations are promulgated pursuant to 
15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2006), a provision of HOEPA which grants broad authority 
WR WKH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH %RDUG WR UHJXODWH XQIDLU RU GHFHSWLYH SUDFWLFHV ´LQ
FRQQHFWLRQZLWK  PRUWJDJHORDQVµ See also 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f) (defining 
´FUHGLWRUµ VXEMHFW WR7,/$ WR LQFOXGHDOO OHQGHUV 6RPHVPDOO OHQGHUVZLWK
very limited activity are exempted from Regulation Z.  Truth in Lending 
(Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(17)(i) (2008). 
40. 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,522. 
41. Id. at 44,603;; 12 C.F.R. § 226.34(ii)(A). 
42. 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603.  See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a).  Construction 
loans, bridge loans, reverse-­mortgages, and home equity lines of credit are 
not covered.  Id. 
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refinance by the creditor or an affiliate, and the amount of 
LQWHUHVWLVIUR]HQIRUDWOHDVWIRXU\HDUVLLL´IDLOXUHWRHVFURZ
property taxes and insurance;;µ and (iv) structuring home 
equity lines of credit to evade the requirement of the 
regulation.43 
The remedies available to consumers under the new 
Regulation Z are provided by TILA.  Consumers may bring 
actions against a creditor (meaning an original lender) for 
actual damages, as well as various items of special statutory 
GDPDJHVSOXVFRXUWFRVWVDQGDWWRUQH\·VIHHV44  Claims against 
the assignees of creditors³which are especially important in 
the era of securitization³are more limited.  In the case of a 
securitized loan, the original creditor may be defunct or 
undercapitalized and essentially judgment proof.  In addition, 
the main benefit to a debtor from predatory lending laws would 
arise as a counterclaim or defense in a foreclosure proceeding 
against the assignee, where, in the case of a securitized loan, 
the original lender would typically not be a party. 
With respect to HOEPA loans, a narrow class of very high-­
cost second mortgages, assignees are subject to the same 
remedies available against the original creditor unless they can 
demonstrate that they could not have discovered the violation 
using reasonable due diligence.45  With respect to other 
mortgages, assignees can be held liable only for violations that 
DUH DSSDUHQW RQ WKH IDFH RI WKH FRQVXPHU·V 7,/$-­required 
disclosure statement.46  The statute also creates a limited right 
RI UHVFLVVLRQ DV WR DQ\ ORDQ LQ YLRODWLRQ RI ´WKLV VHFWLRQµ
meaning 15 U.S.C. § 1639, the section authorizing Regulation 
Z.47  Thus, mortgages may arguably be rescinded where they 
violate Regulation Z. 
 
43. 73 Fed. Reg. at 44,603.  See also 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(b).  Additional 
rules are promulgated with respect to mortgage brokers, appraisers and 
servicers.  73 Fed. Reg. at 44,604;; 12 C.F.R. § 226.36.  The regulation applies 
the same rules to loans already governed by HOEPA, which governs only 
high-­cost second mortgages.  15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa);; 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a).  
This is not intended to be a complete description of the amendments to 
Regulation Z, which are complex and are explained in detail in ninety-­two 
pages of the Federal Register.  73 Fed. Reg. at 44,522-­44,614. 
44. Truth in Lending;; Part II, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1716 (proposed July 9, 
2008);; 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). 
45. Truth in Lending;; Part II, 73 Fed. Reg. at 1716;; 15 U.S.C. § 1641(d). 
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a). 
47. Id. § 1639(j).  See also id. §§ 1635(a), 1641(a). 
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The amendments to Regulation Z contain no new 
preemption provisions and would be governed by the same 
limLWHG ´FRQIOLFWµ SUHHPSWLRQ UXOHV DV 7,/$ LQ JHQHUDO48  
However, TILA provisions regarding assignee liability are less 
generous to borrowers than many state subprime lending 
laws.49  This Article proposes that the expansive damages 
provisions of state laws as applied to assignees, targeting the 
same loan practices as Regulation Z, interfere with the federal 
scheme and are therefore preempted. 
 
III.  Federal Preemption of State Subprime Lending Laws 
 
7KH ´GXDO EDQNLQJ V\VWHPµ50 of the United States has 
generated an elaborate law of preemption, meant to resolve 
conflicts between overlapping state and federal jurisdiction.  
Generally speaking, federal law recognizes three species of 
banking law preemption.  The first, express preemption, arises 
when Congress states its intent to preempt state law in a 
statute.51  The second, field preemption, is 
 
preemption [that] may be inferred when federal 
regulation in a particular field is so pervasive as 
to make reasonable the inference that Congress 
left no room for the States to supplement it.  In 
such cases of field preemption, the mere volume 
and complexity of federal regulations 
demonstrate an implicit congressional intent to 
displace all state law.52 
 
48. See Truth in Lending;; Part III, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008) 
(amending Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2009)). 
49. Amzy, supra note 11, at 374-­76;; David J. Weiner, Comment, Assignee 
Liability in State Predatory Lending Laws: How Uncapped Punitive Damages 
Threaten the Secondary Mortgage Market, 55 EMORY L.J. 535, 555 & n.178 
(2006). 
50. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM·R OF NAT·L BANKS, NATIONAL 
BANKS AND THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2003-­DSGI´7KH¶GXDOEDQNLQJV\VWHP·
refers to the parallel state and federal banking systems that co-­exist in the 
8QLWHG6WDWHVµ 
51. See, e.g., Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1004 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (citing Bank of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 
551, 558 (9th Cir. 2002)). 
52. Id. 
13
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7KHWKLUGFRQIOLFWSUHHPSWLRQRFFXUV´ZKHQVWDWHODZDFWXDOO\
conflicts with federal law.  Such a conflict arises when 
compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical 
impossibility, or when state law stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
REMHFWLYHVRI&RQJUHVVµ53 
All of these species of preemption may be deployed in 
arguments for the preemption of state subprime lending laws.  
Federally chartered lenders enjoy something close to field 
preemption and, therefore, are the most clearly protected 
against state predatory lending laws.54  For state-­chartered 
lenders, however, preemption may depend on the specific 
subject-­matter of the state law or the transaction at issue.  
Interest rate limits and ARM transactions regulations, for 
example, are subject to express preemption in particular 
statutes.55  Other state regulations³most importantly 
disclosure rules overlapping with the Truth in Lending Act³
are subject only to conflict preemption.56  Thus, it is a peculiar 
FKDUDFWHULVWLF RI RXU ´GXDOµ EDQNLQJ V\VWHP WKDW ZKHWKHU D
particular mortgage is enforceable³or even a source of liability 
for its owner³depends (among other things) on whether its 
originator or owner is a federally chartered bank or a state-­
organized lender. 
 
A. Preemption for Federally Chartered Institutions 
 
Federal preemption of state law as applied to federally 
chartered institutions³such as a National Bank, Federal 
Savings Bank, or Federal Savings and Loan³is of 
constitutional and statutory origin.  The long tradition of 
federal supremacy in banking traces back to the 1819 decision 
 
53. Id.  See also Wachovia Bank v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 313 (2d Cir. 
2005) (addressing preemption in National Bank Act);; Catherine M. Brennan 
& Meghan S. Musselman, Consumer Credit: Preemptions and Regulations, 41 
MD. BAR J. 18, 20 (Nov./Dec. 2008) (describing three varieties of preemption). 
54. See Silvas, 514 F.3d at 1005 (finding field preemption under Home 
2ZQHUV/RDQ$FWRI´+2/$µ&)5 §§ 560.2(b)(5), (9) (2008)).  But 
see Wachovia, 414 F.3d at 313-­ GHVFULELQJ LVVXH DV ´FRQIOLFW SUHHPSWLRQµ
under National Bank Act). 
55. See supra notes 3 & 4 and accompanying text. 
56. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
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McCulloch v. Maryland, where the Supreme Court ruled, 
relying on the Supremacy Clause, that Maryland could not tax 
a federal bank.57  The Supreme Court recently reiterated the 
rule of preemption in Watters v. Wachovia Bank,58 asserting 
WKDW´VWDWHODZPD\QRWVLJQLILFDQWO\EXUGHQDQDWLRQDOEDQN·V
own exercise of its real estate lending power, just as it may not 
FXUWDLO RU KLQGHU D QDWLRQDO EDQN·V HIILFLHQW H[HUFLVH RI DQ\
other power, incidental or enumerated under the [National 
%DQN$FW@µ59 
7KH2IILFHRIWKH&RPSWUROOHURIWKH&XUUHQF\WKH´2&&µ
in the Department of thH 7UHDVXU\ ´LV WKH IHGHUDO DJHQF\
HQWUXVWHG ZLWK WKH ¶SULPDU\ UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU VXUYHLOODQFH RI
WKH EXVLQHVV RI EDQNLQJ DXWKRUL]HG E\·µ WKH 1DWLRQDO %DQN
Act.60  In 2004, the OCC adopted a rule recognizing that state 
laws aimed at predatory lending were necessarily preempted, 
in the case of nationally chartered banks, by 12 U.S.C. § 371.61  
The regulation states: 
 
Except where made applicable by Federal law, 
state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a 
QDWLRQDO EDQN·V DELOLW\ WR IXOO\ H[HUFLVH LWV
Federally authorized real estate lending powers 
do not apply to national banks.  Specifically, a 
national bank may make real estate loans under 
12 U.S.C. [§] 371 and § 34.3, without regard to 
state law limitations concerning: 
. . . . 
(3) Loan-­to-­value ratios;; 
 
57. 17 U.S. 316, 436. 
58. 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (affirming that mortgage lending is a power 
explicitly granted to national banks by the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 
(Seventh) (2006)). 
59. Id. at 13 (extending § 371 preemption to national bank subsidiaries).  
In addition, any limits on mortgage points and fees set by state law may be 
preempted by the federal Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
&RQWURO$FWRI´','0&$µSee, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-­7a(a)(1) (2006);; 
%HQHILFLDO1DW·O%DQN Y$QGHUVRQ86  -­11 (2003) (preemption of 
state law usury claims);; Wolfert v. Transamerica Home First, Inc., 439 F.3d 
165, 175 (2d Cir. 2006) (reverse mortgage not invalidated by state usury law). 
60. Wachovia Bank v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 312 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 
NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 
256 (1995)). 
61. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2008). 
15
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(4) The terms of credit, including schedule for 
repayment of principal and interest, 
amortization of loans, balance, payments due, 
minimum payments, or term to maturity of the 
loan, including the circumstances under which a 
loan may be called due and payable upon the 
passage of time or a specified event external to 
the loan;; 
. . . . 
(9) Disclosure and advertising, including laws 
requiring specific statements, information, or 
other content to be included in credit application 
forms, credit solicitations, billing statements, 
credit contracts, or other credit-­related 
documents;; 
(10) Processing, origination, servicing, sale or 
purchase of, or investment or participation in, 
mortgages;; 
. . . . 
(12) Rates of interest on loans . . . .62 
 
In short, the regulation holds that a typical state subprime 
lending law cannot be enforced against national banks.  
$OWKRXJK RQO\ LQFLGHQWDOO\ DGGUHVVHG E\ WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW·V
decision in Watters,63 that case leaves little doubt that the 
regulation is valid.  Numerous courts of appeals have held that 
state laws or regulations similar to subprime lending laws³
such as those prohibiting certain practices in consumer 
lending³are inapplicable to national banks on the basis of the 
OCC regulation (or a similar Office of Thrift Supervision 
´276µ UHJXODWRU DQG 6XSUHPH &RXUW SUHFHGHQW64  Thus, it 
 
62. Id. (footnote omitted). 
63. 550 U.S. at 13 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(1) (2006)). 
64. See, e.g., Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1006-­07 
(9th Cir. 2008) (holding that claims against federal savings banks under 
CaliforQLD·V 8QIDLU &RPSHWLWLRQ /DZ and state law claim damages for 
violations of TILA are preempted by the Home Owners Loan Act of 1933 and 
12 C.F.R. §§ 560.2(b)(5), (9) (2008));; Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 
1032, 1037-­ WK &LU  QRWLQJ WKDW SURYLVLRQV RI &DOLIRUQLD·V &LYLO
Code³which require certain disclosures LQ FUHGLW FDUG ´FRQYHQLHQFH
FKHFNVµ³are preempted by the National Bank Act, which empowers national 
EDQNV WR ´ORDQ PRQH\ RQ SHUVRQDO VHFXULW\µ 3DF &DSLWDO %DQN 1$ Y
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should be clear that mortgage loans made by federally 
chartered institutions are not subject to state predatory 
lending statutes, which explicitly target the very conduct that 
LVDWWKHKHDUWRIWKHEDQN·VOHQGLQJSRZHUV65 
The OCC regulation does, however, contain a savings 
FODXVHIRUWKHEDFNJURXQGODZRI´JHQHUDODSSOLFDWLRQµ66 of the 
states, consistent with the general law of preemption.  The 
OCC states: 
 
State laws on the following subjects are not 
inconsistent with the real estate lending powers 
of national banks and apply to national banks to 
the extent that they only incidentally affect the 
H[HUFLVH RI QDWLRQDO EDQNV· UHDO HVWDWH OHQGLQJ
powers: 
(1) Contracts;; 
(2) Torts;; 
(3) Criminal law;; 
. . . . 
(9) Any other law the effect of which the OCC 
determines to be incidental to the real estate 
lending operations of national banks or otherwise 
consistent with the powers and purposes set out 
in § 34.3(a).67 
 
Because of the exemption for laws of general application, recent 
federal court decisions reveal a muddled picture on the 
question of whether federally chartered lenders are exempt 
 
Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 352 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding state law regulating 
tax refund loans is preempted as applied to national banks and their agents);; 
Wachovia Bank, 414 F.3d at 312, 321 (holding that federal law preempts 
state regulation of operating subsidiaries of national banks, including all 
bank examinations and inspections). 
65. See Levitin, supra note 10, at 163-­172 and accompanying footnotes 
(reviewing law on preemption of direct state regulation of federally chartered 
LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG ILQGLQJ WKDW ´WKHUH DSSHDUV WR EH little residual state 
DXWKRULW\WRUHJXODWHQDWLRQDOEDQNVGLUHFWO\µ 
66. Watters, 550 U.S. at 11.  See also Barnett Bank of Marion County, 
N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) (holding that states may regulate 
QDWLRQDO EDQNV ZKHUH GRLQJ VR ´GRHV QRW SUHYHQW RU VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQWHUIHUH
ZLWKWKHQDWLRQDOEDQN·VH[HUFLVHRILWVSRZHUVµ 
67. 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(b) (2008) (footnote omitted). 
17
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from state unfair trade practices claims.  For example, in a 
multi-­district class action against a mortgage servicing 
FRPSDQ\XQGHUYDULRXVVWDWHV·XQIDLU WUDGHSUDFWLFHVVWDWXWHV
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held 
that, regardless of the statute invoked, preemption depends 
upon whether the claim is the equivalent of a common law 
fraud or breach of contract claim.68  The claim would only be 
preempted if it could not have been brought under the common 
law.69  The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit applied a similar substantive analysis, asking whether 
the VWDWH ODZ DV VRXJKW WR EH DSSOLHG ZRXOG ´VLJQLILFDQWO\
LQWHUIHUHµZLWKDQ\RIWKHSRZHUVJUDQWHGE\IHGHUDOODZ70  The 
court held that claims based on lending disclosures were 
preempted even if brought under general unfair trade 
statutes.71   Similarly, the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that claims under New 
<RUN·VJHQHUDOFRQVXPHU IUDXGVWDWXWHZHUHQRWSUHHPSWHGDV
applied to a federal savings association, although the OTS 
´RFFXSLHV WKH HQWLUH ILHOG RI OHQGLQJ Uegulation for federal 
VDYLQJV DVVRFLDWLRQVµ EHFDXVH WKH FODLPV GLG QRW SXUSRUW WR
´VHWVXEVWDQWLYHVWDQGDUGVRUHVWDEOLVKSDUWLFXODUUHTXLUHPHQWV
IRUOHQGLQJRSHUDWLRQVLQWKHVWDWHRI1HZ<RUNµ72 
Some lower courts have applied a more formalistic 
approach, resulting in different outcomes.  For example, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of West 
Virginia ruled, in a series of decisions in 2008 and 2009, that 
common law claims of unconscionability can be asserted 
against federally chartered banks, even if they are directed at 
´SUHGDWRU\ OHQGLQJ SUDFWLFHVµ ´KRPH HTXLW\ VNLPPLQJµ or 
´ERJXV DSSUDLVDOVµ ZKLFK DUH DOO VXEMHFWV WKDW WKH 2&& KDV
 
68. In re Ocwen Servicing, LLC, 491 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2007). 
69. Id. at 642-­43, 647-­48 (finding that in many instances it was not 
possible to determine from the complaint whether the claim was preempted). 
70. Rose v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 513 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2008). 
71. Id. at 1037-­38.  See also Jefferson v. Chase Home Fin., No. 06-­6510, 
2008 WL 1883484, at *12-­14 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2008) (finding that state laws 
prohibiting misrepresentation in general are not preempted under HOLA, 
while laws aimed specifically at banking or purporting to dictate substantive 
banking practices are preempted). 
72. Binetti v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 446 F. Supp. 2d 217, 219-­20 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006) (applying OTS preemption regulation 12 C.F.R. § 560.2 (2008)). 
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made clear are preempted.73   A 2008 decision in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
held that claims against mortgage lenders based on state 
unfair or deceptive practices statutes were not preempted 
because the statutes themselves did not specifically target 
banking practices.74  However, because subprime lending laws 
explicitly target banks and lending practices, they cannot 
DUJXDEO\EH ´ODZVRIJHQHUDODSSOLFDWLRQµDQGWKHUHIRUHZRXOG
not fall within even the most generous application of the 
´EDFNJURXQGODZµH[FHSWLRQWRSUHHPSWLRQ75 
The recent Supreme Court decision in Cuomo v. Clearing 
+RXVH$VV·Q does not purport to change this law.  That decision 
GLVFXVVHGZKHWKHUWKHH[FOXVLYH´YLVLWRULDOSRZHUVµSURYLVLRQRI
the National Bank Act, and OCC regulations interpreting the 
SUHHPSWLYH VFRSH RI WKH 2&&·V H[FOXVLYH YLVitorial powers, 
prevented the New York State Attorney General from 
requesting documents from national banks.  Citing a 
distinction between regulation and enforcement, the Supreme 
Court held that although a subpoena would be preempted by 
WKH2&&·V H[FOXVLYH visitorial powers, a lawsuit to enforce an 
otherwise valid and non-­preempted state law would not.76  The 
Court observed that many state laws were not preempted as 
applied to national banks, including some that were banking-­
directed, but the Court did not hold that any particular state 
law was not preempted, nor did it address the general rules 
governing the preemption of state law burdening federal 
banking powers.  In fact, the only state statute specifically 
mentioned in the decision is the one that the court held was 
SUHHPSWHG1HZ<RUN·VExecutive Law permitting the Attorney 
General to issue subpoenas to investigate fraud.77  Thus, the 
decision presumes that, in a hypothetical future lawsuit, the 
state laws that would be enforced by the Attorney General are 
 
73. Conrad v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 08-­0829, 2009 WL 36478, at 
*2-­3 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 5, 2009) (concluding that claims based on ARMs are 
preempted by 12 C.F.R. § 34.21(a) (2008), but that claims of unconscionable 
banking practices are not preempted). 
74. Baldanzi v. WFC Holdings Corp., No. 07-­9551, 2008 WL 4924987, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2008). 
75. See supra notes 61-­62 and accompanying text. 
76. Cuomo v. COHDULQJ+RXVH$VV·Q6&W-­22 (2009). 
77. Id. 
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not preempted.78  Accordingly, although Cuomo strikes down 
one OCC regulation on preemption (concerning visitorial 
powers), it does not undercut 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 or the doctrine 
articulated in Watters or other prior cases.79 
If a national bank or federal savings association initiates a 
mortgage loan, it is clear under Watters, OTS and OCC 
regulations, and other precedent, that the terms of such a 
mortgage are not governed by state predatory lending laws 
(although, as noted above, they may be governed by more 
general trade and consumer practices statutes).  The Supreme 
&RXUW KDV VWDWHG WKDW ´>V@HFXULW\ DJDLQVW VLJQLILFDQW
interference by state regulators is a characteristic condition of 
WKH ¶EXVLQHVV RI EDQNLQJ· FRQGXFWHG E\ QDWLRQDO EDQNV DQG
mortgage lendiQJLVRQHDVSHFWRIWKDWEXVLQHVVµ80 
However, preemption is only of limited help to federally 
chartered banks unless it protects them where they are the 
assignee of a mortgage as well as the originator, or where they 
are the beneficial holder of the mortgage through RMBS or an 
RMBS derivative.  There are arguments³as yet untested³for 
why they should be so protected.  First, Watters-­style 
preemption goes further than the power to make loans.  For 
example, federal law empowers national banks not only to 
make PRUWJDJH ORDQV EXW DOVR WR ´SXUFKDVH RU VHOOµ VXFK
loans.81  When a national bank acquires a mortgage or an 
RMBS or its derivative, it is exercising that power to 
´SXUFKDVHµ UHDO HVWDWH ORDQV  To impose liability on the 
national bank for that exercise of its banking power runs afoul 
of Watters and 12 U.S.C. § 371.  As McCulloch v. Maryland 
shows, the protection of federally created banks from state-­
created, potentially destructive burdens is precisely the 
 
78. 7KH RQO\ GHFLVLRQ WR GDWH FRQVLGHULQJ WKH 1DWLRQDO %DQN $FW·V
preemption of substantive state law in light of Cuomo appeared to find no 
change in the law and applied the preexisting standard that national banks 
ZHUH SURWHFWHG IURP ´XQGXO\ EXUGHQVRPH DQG GXSOLFDWLYHµ VWDWH ODZV WKDW
´VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQWHUIHUHZLWKµ WKH H[HUFLVH RI WKHLU IHGHUDO SRZHUV 'DYLV Y
Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A., No. 06-­04804, 2009 WL 2868817, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 
Sept. 3, 2009). 
79. Only time will tell whether the decision signals a new hostility of the 
Court toward preemption arguments in general. 
80. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 18 (2007). 
81. 12 U.S.C. § 371(a) (2006). 
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purpose of preemption.82 
As noted above, federal law recognizes only very limited 
assignee liability for violations of Regulation Z that are akin to 
conduct prohibited by state law predatory lending statutes.  A 
state power to impose upon a national bank unlimited assignee 
liability, arising from mortgages that are valid under federal 
DQG´EDFNJURXQGµVWDWHODZDVZHOODVGHSULYHWKRVHPRUWJDJHV
RIDOOYDOXHFOHDUO\DSSURDFKHVWKH´SRZHUWRGHVWUR\µRIZKLFK
McCulloch warned.83  ´$FFRUGLQJO\DVSDUWRIWKHLU¶EXVLQHVVRI
EDQNLQJ·QDWLRQDOEDQNVVKRXOGEHable to purchase mortgage 
loans free of state banking law restrictions that would 
RWKHUZLVHDSSO\µ84 
There is a contrary argument that a loan governed by state 
law should be deemed taken subject to all state laws applicable 
to that loan at the time of acquisition, in which the loan is 
acquired from a state chartered lender and, therefore, is 
presumptively governed by state, not federal, law at the time of 
acquisition.85  However, imposing vicarious liability for 
damages on a national bank by operation of state banking law, 
solely because of the purchase or assignment of a loan to the 
national bank acting as trustee (as occurred in LaSalle Bank), 
is another matter entirely. 
Imposing assignee liability on national banks would 
´VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQWHUIHUHµ ZLWK DQG ´VLJQLILFDQWO\ LPSDLUµ WKH
QDWLRQDO EDQNV· H[HUFLVH RI WKHLU DXWKRULW\ WR SXUFKDVH UHDO
estate loans.86   It is manifest, now more than ever, that 
´>Q@DWLRQDOEDQNVDUHQRWPHUHO\SULYDWHPRQH\HGLQVWLWXWLRQV
but agencies of the United States created under its laws to 
SURPRWHLWVILVFDOSROLFLHVµ87  Allowing damages actions against 
 
82. 7 U.S. 316, 391 (1819). 
83. Id. 
84. Scheiner, supra note 25, at 7. 
85. Cf. )HG1DW·O0RUWJDJH$VV·QY/HINRZLW])6XSS
6'1<H[SODLQLQJWKDW)10$DFTXLUHVPRUWJDJHV´DFFompanied by 
WKHDSSXUWHQDQFHVRIVWDWHODZµDQGWKDWVXFKODZVDUHQRWSUHHPSWHGVROHO\
because FNMA purchases the mortgage). 
86. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 12 (2007). 
87. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 322 (2d Cir. 2005) 
TXRWLQJ)LUVW1DW·O%DQNRI+DUWIRUG:LVY&LW\RI+DUWIRUG86
550 (1927)).  Indeed, some national bank holding companies are now 
substantially owned by the U.S. Government.  Potential preemption by virtue 
of federal ownership, however, raises distinct legal issues. 
21
274 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:253 
federally-­chartered institutions because they acquired 
distressed mortgages, either directly or through RMBS or their 
derivatives, can only add the proverbial insult to injury, and 
exacerbate the financial crisis.88  Allowing states to render 
valueless entire pools of previously valid mortgages³as might 
occur in the Fremont case, for example³could work nearly as 
much havoc on the system as unlimited damages liability to 
assignees.  Viewed in that light, there is a strong argument 
that if a state statute allows assignee liability where it would 
be precluded under federal law, or would invalidate a loan that 
would be valid under federal or background state law,89 the 
statute should be preempted as applied to national banks. 
 
B. Preemption Arguments Under Regulation Z 
 
Regulation Z provides a basis for a preemption argument 
against state subprime lending laws that was previously 
unavailable.  As noted above, however, TILA preempts only 
´LQFRQVLVWHQWµ VWDWH ODZs.90  Although the new Regulation Z 
promulgates disclosure requirements, it also contains 
numerous substantive limits on the terms that may be included 
in mortgages.  The Federal Reserve Board regulations 
interpreting TILA preemption, while specifically addressing 
matters such as disclosure requirements, do not address the 
preemptive effect of substantive regulatory limits on the 
permissible terms of mortgages (presumably because those 
regulations are new).91   Thus, there is room to argue that 
 
88. In addition, on March 4, 2009, the Obama administration announced 
a plan to pay mortgage holders and servicers to modify mortgages in favor of 
borrowers.  Michael Phillips & Ruth Simon, Mortgage Bailout to Aid 1 in 9 
U.S. Homeowners, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2009, at A1.  These plans contribute 
WRWKH)HGHUDO*RYHUQPHQW·VLQFUHDVLQJUHJXODWLRQRIWKHGHWDLOVRIPRUWJDJH
lending, weakening arguments that this is an area reserved for concurrent 
state control.  While legal analysis must await final rule-­making or 
OHJLVODWLRQ DQ\ VWDWH ODZV LQWHUIHULQJ ZLWK WKH JRYHUQPHQW·V SODQV WR
restructure individual mortgages³including liabilities imposed on mortgage 
holders or services that might impair their willingness to participate in such 
a program³would face strong preemption arguments. 
89. Cf. %HQHILFLDO1DW·O%DQNY$QGHUVRQ86  Fiting 
)DUPHUV·	0HFKDQLFV·1DW·O%DQNY'HDULQJ86QRWLQJWKDW
state usury laws invalidating debts owed to national banks are preempted). 
90. 15 U.S.C. § 1610(b) (2006). 
91. 12 C.F.R. § 226.28(a) (2008). 
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because Regulation Z creates detailed and extensive rules 
regarding the permissible terms of mortgages, especially 
higher-­rate mortgages, state laws that create more restrictive 
UXOHV ´VWDQG> @ DV DQ REVWDFOH WR WKH DFFRPSOLVKPHQW DQG
execution oI WKH IXOO SXUSRVHV DQG REMHFWLYH>V@µ RI WKH IHGHUDO
ODZDQG´ZRXOGIUXVWUDWHWKHSXUSRVHVRIWKHIHGHUDOVFKHPHµ92  
This is especially so with regard to aggressive state law 
remedies, which would subject assignees to much greater 
liability risk than does 7,/$  ´$Q LQWHJUDO SDUW RI DQ\
regulatory scheme is the remedy available against those who 
YLRODWH WKH UHJXODWLRQVµ93  State law remedies against 
assignees going beyond those permitted by federal law would 
upset the delicate policy balance between enforcement benefits 
and the costs of liability risks that presumably determine the 
contours of the federal rule.94  Thus, there is a strong argument 
that those state law remedies and the more restrictive 
VXEVWDQWLYHODZWKDWWKH\HQIRUFH´VWDQG>@DVDQREVWDFOHto the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
REMHFWLYHVµRIIHGHUDOSROLF\DQGDUHWKHUHIRUHSUHHPSWHG95 
A complete rendition of the argument for implied 
preemption, utilizing the legislative history of TILA and 
Regulation Z, is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, the 
potential exists to argue that TILA and Regulation Z created 
comprehensive standards for high-­interest mortgage practices 
and related liability, which, since the recent amendment to 
Regulation Z, preempt all state law purporting to impose either 
more or less restrictive standards and liabilities. 
 
 
92. Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 351 (2d Cir. 
2008) (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 109 (2000);; Rice v. 
Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)). 
93. Silvas v. E*Trade Mortgage Corp., 514 F.3d 1001, 1007 n.3 (9th Cir. 
2008) (citing San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)) 
(holding that longer state statute of limitations was preempted by shorter 
federal statute for the same violations). 
94. Rescission rights, however, may be expressly reserved, depending 
upon how they arise under state law.  TILA contains a savings clause 
regarding rights of rHVFLVVLRQ LQ IRUHFORVXUH VWDWLQJ WKDW ´>Q@RWKLQJ LQ WKLV
subsection [15 U.S.C. § 1635(i), regarding rescission rights in foreclosure] 
DIIHFWVDFRQVXPHU·VULJKWRIUHVFLVVLRQLQUHFRXSPHQWXQGHU6WDWH ODZµ 
U.S.C. § 1635(i)(3).  Thus, to the extent thDW VWDWH ODZSURYLGHV D ´ULJKW RI
UHVFLVVLRQLQUHFRXSPHQWµLWLVQRWSUHHPSWHGXQGHU5HJXODWLRQ=Id. 
95. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). 
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C. The Impact of Wyeth v. Levine 
 
The United States Supreme Court recently addressed 
implied preemption in Wyeth v. Levine, decided on March 4, 
2009, holding that approvals of drug warnings by the Food and 
Drug Administration under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act 
´)'&$µ GLG QRW SUHHPSW SURGXFW OLDELOLW\ ODZVXLWV EURXJKW
under state tort law.96  Although preemption was rejected in 
that instance, the Wyeth decision is distinguishable from the 
arguments proposed above for banking preemption in 
important ways. 
First, the FDCA contains an express and very broad 
savings clause that is more expansive than TILA and that is 
entirely absent from the National Bank Act and other federal 
banking enabling statutes.97  The FDCA provides that state law 
LVSUHHPSWHGRQO\XSRQD´GLUHFWDQGSRVLWLYHFRQIOLFWµZLWKWKH
federal statute.98  In contrast, the National Bank Act and other 
statutes creating federally chartered banks contain no savings 
clauses and are interpreted to preempt any state law that 
´VLJQLILFDQWO\ LPSDLU>V@µ RU ´VLJQLILFDQWO\ interfere>V@µ ZLWK DQ
authority or power granted by federal law.99  TILA, the source 
of Regulation Z, preempts state law to the extent that it is 
´LQFRQVLVWHQWµZLWKIHGHUDOODZ100 a far less restrictive standard 
WKDQWKH)'&$·V´GLUHFWDQGSRVLWLYHFRQIOLFWµ101  The Supreme 
 
96. 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009). 
97. Compare Pub. L. No. 101-­535, § 6(c)(1) (21 U.S.C. § 343-­1 note) 
(2006) with National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). 
98. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195-­96 (citing 76 Stat. 793 (amending FDCA)).  
See also Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-­74, § 10 
(Application of State Law);; Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-­781, § 
202 (Effect on State laws). 
99. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 12 (2007). 
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1). 
101. As the Supreme Court observed in Wyeth, Congress had enacted 
express preemption for one class of products covered by the FDCA³medical 
devices³but had declined to do so for pharmaceuticals, supporting an 
inference against intent to preempt state tort law regarding pharmaceuticals.  
Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1196.  This same argument might be deployed against 
implied preemption under TILA, where certain matters, such as interest 
rates and ARMs, are explicitly preempted (with opt-­out rights), while others 
are governed only by conflict preemption.  See Truth in Lending (Regulation 
Z), 12 C.F.R. pt. 226 (2009)).  However, the proponent of preemption under 
TILA would not be arguing for implied blanket preemption of state law, but 
UDWKHU WKDW LQ WKHSDUWLFXODU FDVH WKH VWDWH ODZDVDSSOLHG LV ´LQFRQVLVWHQWµ 
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Court has interpreted a general savings clause to incorporate 
WKH &RXUW·V JHQHUDO FRQIOLFW SUHHPSWLRQ MXULVSUXGHQFH ZKLFK
UHFRJQL]HV LPSOLHG SUHHPSWLRQ LQ WKH FDVH RI ´IUXVWUDWLRQ-­of-­
SXUSRVHµ102  The same argument can be made against state 
subprime lending laws that embody greater restrictions or 
liability for lenders, or more generous terms for borrowers, 
than federal law.  The courts should recognize that federal law 
embodies a policy that, up to a point, encourages subprime 
lending and the enforceability of mortgages, and the states 
must respect the balance struck by federal authorities between 
lender and borrower interests. 
Second, as the Supreme Court observed in Wyeth, the 
FDCA contains no provisions regarding a remedy for persons 
harmed by violations of the regulations.103   But in the case of 
TILA, as detailed above, remedies are provided, which, through 
the recent amendments to Regulation Z, address precisely the 
same harms from predatory mortgage lending that state law 
attempts to reach.104  The existence of these remedies weighs 
against applying the result in Wyeth to the banking context. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Legal reform in response to the credit crisis should not 
impose greater uncertainty and liability on markets already 
stressed beyond the breaking point.  If, as it appears, 
government policy is to support the revival of the securitized 
mortgage market, it is important that the market be presented 
with uniform standards regarding mortgage practices and the 
liability of ultimate mortgage holders.  Federal law in the form 
of Regulation Z and TILA now provides the opportunity for 
such standards.  Courts should utilize the various doctrines of 
banking preemption to apply uniform standards to federally 
 
with the goals and objectives of the detailed federal scheme. 
102. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 869, 874 (2000) (citing 
)LGHOLW\)HG 6DY	/RDQ$VV·Q Y GH OD&XHVWD 86  153 (1982)) 
(holding that a savings clause for common law tort actions incorporates the 
VDPH LPSOLHG ´IUXVWUDWLRQ-­of-­SXUSRVHµ VWDQGDUG WKDW ZRXOG SUHHPSW VWDWH
UXOHVWKDW´DFWXDOO\FRQIOLFWµZLWKIHGHUDOVWDQGDUGV 
103. Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199 (noting that in not enacting remedies, 
´>H@YLGHQWO\ >&RQJUHVV@ GHWHUPLQHG WKDW ZLGHO\ DYDLODEOH VWDWH ULJKWV RI
DFWLRQSURYLGHGDSSURSULDWHUHOLHIIRULQMXUHGFRQVXPHUVµ 
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). 
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chartered institutions originating and holding mortgages, 
RMBS, and their derivatives, and, perhaps, to all mortgage 
lenders and assignees pursuant to Regulation Z. 
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